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Abstract.  
Although IS literature is quite rich on analyzing control modes in inter-
organizational relationships, there exists quite sparse empirical work on the ef-
fects of control modes on the relationship between a platform vendor and third-
party developers in software-based platform ecosystems. Drawing on IS control 
literature and trust theory, we conducted an online survey with 125 game de-
velopers of the online gaming platform Steam, in which we examined the per-
ception of clan and self-control mechanisms and how they influence develop-
ers’ trust in the platform vendor and their intention to stick with the platform. 
We demonstrate that clan control positively impacts both trust and stickiness, 
while self-control only affects the latter. Further, our results show that develop-
ers’ trust in the platform vendor serves as a mediator explaining the mecha-
nisms of why clan control positively affects platform stickiness. 
Keywords: Software Platforms, Informal Control Modes, Trust, Stickiness 
1 Introductions 
By empowering third-party developers to complement functionalities and applications 
to a core software product, software-based platforms have become a promising and 
growing approach in the software industry to develop and distribute software [1]. The 
ecosystem of such platforms includes the platform vendor, numerous third-party de-
velopers and the platform users. Although such platforms exist since the early days of 
personal computing, where developers provide software and add-ons for operation 
systems and system software, like Microsoft Windows and its office-suite [2, 3], new 
and innovative software-platforms have emerged in the mobile and online context [1]. 
Apple for example, a platform where developers can develop and sell mobile apps, 
has experienced a massive overall growth in recent years. This is reflected in six mil-
lion registered app-developers, more than one million active apps and revenues of 10 
billion dollars from their App Store sales in 2013 [4, 5]. The game distribution and 
social network platform Steam is on its way to replace the old game retail selling 
system, while competing platforms struggle to grow in the same market [6]. These 
mobile and online platforms and their ecosystems have already been acknowledged 
several times as a significant novel research opportunity for IS research (e.g., [1, 7]). 
Control theory [8] has often been invoked in order to analyze and explain the coor-
dination and alignment between two parties, and control modes are an integral part of 
platform governance [1]. While formal control (i.e., process and outcome control) 
relies on written contracts and regular observations, informal control (i.e., clan and 
self-control) is exercised with social or people strategies by cultivating shared inter-
ests and values and by encouraging self-regulation. Informal control is of primary 
interest to our study, given that the relationship between a platform vendor and third-
party developers is less hierarchical and more dependent compared to traditional 
software development contexts, which makes the implementation of informal control 
more promising than formal control [9-11]. There are two main reasons for this: 
First, the relationship of a platform vendor and third-party developers is less hier-
archical, because interests and goals, like increasing the platforms’ customer base and 
generating revenues, are not necessarily incongruent. Therefore, the intention to en-
gage in opportunistic behaviors is less prominent and the need of strict supervision 
and alignment from one side less necessary [11]. Further, software platforms are more 
open [12] and the myriad of third-party developers would make it prohibitively costly 
and time consuming to command and supervise each single software project. 
 Second, both parties rely heavily on each other in order to perform 
successfully [13]. On the one hand, a platform provides resources and tools for devel-
opment and distribution of third-party software, and offers access to the platform’s 
customer base [14]. Developers hence have to trust the platform vendor that these 
crucial resources will continuously be provided. On the other hand, the success of a 
platform is prominently determined by having enough developers offering applica-
tions on one side to attract customers on the other and vice versa [15]. Consequently, 
platform vendors depend on developers’ intention to become loyal members of the 
platform ecosystem. Given that trust and loyalty are essential parts of relationship 
quality [16] and an enduring and cooperative relationship between a platform vendor 
and developers is crucial for a healthy ecosystem [17], we will further focus on devel-
opers’ trust in a platform vendor and on stickiness of a platform. 
Two major research gaps on control modes and trust are particular noteworthy. 
Previous studies have widely examined control modes within organizations (e.g., [18, 
19]) and between organizations (e.g., [20, 21]) and have largely focused on formal 
control modes (e.g., [20, 22]). However, there is still little understanding about the 
effects of informal control modes in online platform contexts. Further, previous work 
on the interplay of control modes–either formal or informal–and trust have found 
conflicting results about whether the constructs are negatively or positively connected 
(e.g., [23, 24]). Studies have, for example, analyzed the interplay of control, trust and 
risk in strategic alliances [23], the effects of ideology tenets on team effectiveness 
through trust in open source development [25] and the coevolution of trust, control 
and learning in joint ventures [26]. Despite significant research in this area, effects of 
informal control modes on trust in platform settings has remained underexplored [1]. 
The purpose of this paper is therefore to understand how informal control modes, 
i.e. clan control and self-control, affect third-party developers’ trust in the platform 
vendor and stickiness of a platform. In the next section, we lay out the theoretical 
background of this paper, followed by our research hypotheses. We describe our re-
search methodology in section 4 and present the results of an online survey with 125 
game developers of the Steam platform in section 5. In section 6, we discuss main 
findings, implications and limitations, and conclude the paper with final remarks. 
2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 Trust in a Platform Vendor 
Despite widespread agreement of the importance of trust in human interactions, pre-
vious research has defined and conceptualized trust in a variety of ways [27, 28]. In 
IS literature, a commonly used definition is the willingness of one party (the trustor) 
to be vulnerable to the actions of another party (the trustee), based on the expectation 
that the other party will perform a particular important action [29]. While most con-
ceptualizations aim at trust in interpersonal relations, trust in online contexts is often 
based on trust in organizations [30]. For instance, customers may trust an online 
shopping website for purchasing products, or third-party developers place their trust 
in a platform vendor or in a software platform as a collective actor. 
Three dimensions are constantly used in e-commerce literature for characterizing 
trust, i.e. the beliefs in the competence, integrity and benevolence of the trustee [28, 
29]. In a platform context, competence refers to the developer’s perception of the 
ability and knowledge of a platform vendor to perform needed actions and to show 
expected behaviors. Developers for example expect from a platform vendor to have 
knowledge about providing a technical infrastructure, to have the ability to attract 
customers and to promote the platform with its products. Integrity is the perception 
that a platform vendor will act ethically and adhere to announced or expected princi-
ples and promises. Developers for example believe that a platform vendor provides 
promised resources and development tools and places products in the platform’s store 
equitably. Finally, benevolence refers to the beliefs that a platform vendor will gener-
ally do good and will not behave merely opportunistic. A platform vendor may, for 
example, demonstrate benevolence by showing empathy towards developers’ con-
cerns and needs, which in turn may reduce uncertainty on the developers’ side. 
2.2 Platform Stickiness 
As a crucial platform-related outcome, third-party developers’ loyalty towards a plat-
form, i.e. their willingness to constantly participate in and stick with a platform over 
time, has been shown to maintain a healthy platform ecosystem [17]. Accordingly, 
platform stickiness is a crucial performance factor that indicates a persistent and loyal 
relationship between a platform and its developers. Based on Zott et al. [31], we de-
fine platform stickiness as the ability of a platform to retain third-party developers on 
their platform, which is reflected in developers’ intention to continue contributing to a 
platform ecosystem. When developers continue to develop and update apps for the 
platform and to engage in the platform community, they usually contribute to the 
platform’s productivity, robustness and innovative capacity [15, 17]. By contrast, 
when developers switch to a rival platform, they are likely to destabilize the aban-
doned platform ecosystem through the drain of knowledge and expertise. Even worse, 
rival platforms and their customer bases may benefit from the influx of developers 
and their apps, which may ultimately tip network effects in favor of rival platforms. 
2.3 Platform Control Modes 
According to control literature (e.g., [8, 32]), control refers to a controller’s attempts 
by which he or she influences an individual or an individual group (the controlee) to 
act in accordance with the objectives of the controller. Control modes can be subdi-
vided into formal control and informal control. Formal control, can be further split 
into output and process (or also called behavior) control. With output control, control-
lers pre-specify output requirements and performance targets as objectives, which are 
then monitored, evaluated and accordingly rewarded. By contrast, under process con-
trol, specific procedures and methodologies are pre-determined, while characteristics 
of outcomes are free to be chosen by the controlee. 
Informal control is categorized into clan control and self-control [8, 32]. Through 
clan control, controllers are able to minimize the differences between controlee’s 
goals and their own strategies, by promulgating common values, beliefs, and behav-
iors. Members of a group of controlees therefore usually commit themselves to these 
mutual values and beliefs and thus often adopt comparable processes with similar 
performance outcomes. Clan control may lead to a sense of cohesiveness among clan 
members, which in turn facilitates self-regulatory mechanisms on a group level (e.g., 
monitoring, evaluating and correcting each other) in accordance with shared values 
and beliefs. In terms of self-control, controllers encourage controlees to exercise self-
management and self-regulation by granting autonomy, providing tools for self-
management and structuring the work environment appropriately. Controlees can 
organize themselves, mostly make their own decisions and evaluate themselves based 
on their own performance. Thus, control lies in the hands of each controlee. 
Currently, a variety of informal control mechanisms are observed on software-
based platforms [1]. As an example for clan control, Apple positions its products, 
primarily through its promotional campaigns and branding strategies, as being innova-
tive, well designed and for people with a trendy lifestyle, which is reflected in the 
design, usability and user experience of Apple products. Customers and third-party 
developers mainly share these norms and values, which in turn manifest themselves in 
the high-quality designs of third-party apps. Conversely, design regulations are most-
ly absent in Google’s Android ecosystem and therefore developers individually de-
cide on the look-and-feel of their apps, which is an example for self-control [11]. 
3 Hypotheses Development 
We first develop the hypotheses related to the effects of clan and self-control on trust 
in the platform vendor (H1) and platform stickiness (H2), followed by hypotheses 
related to the mediating role of trust (H3). The research model is shown in Figure 1. 
3.1 The Effects of Informal Control Modes on Trust in Platform Vendor 
By definition, clans rely heavily on trust [33]. With clan control mechanisms, control-
lers are able to minimize the differences between controlee’s goals and their own 
strategies, by promulgating common values, beliefs, and behaviors. Carefully select-
ing and socializing members usually serves in identifying with shared beliefs and in 
adopting comparable goals and behaviors, which in turn often results in a group of 
individuals sharing these commonalities [8]. Strong clan cultures are likely to facili-
tate cohesiveness which in turn strengthens the willingness of controlees to trust the 
other party’s benevolence [33]. Further, being certain that a partner will pursue shared 
goals instead of opportunistic interest usually leads to a higher confidence in the part-
ner and the partners integrity [23]. Applied to the platform context, nurturing common 
platform values and cultivating shared goals might in turn also cultivate developers’ 
trust in the platform vendor. 
Self-control is based on self-management and self-regulating mechanisms. In order 
to implement self-control, controllers are granting autonomy to controlees without 
applying any other forms of regulation [8]. In view of the absence of regulation, 
granting autonomy requires a certain degree of trust in the controlees’ intention to 
behave accordingly to the controller’s interests and goals [21]. Given that trust is seen 
as a reciprocal concept, more trust by one party usually results in more trust by the 
other party [23]. Therefore, controllers being trusted to regulate themselves will in-
crease their intention to trust the controlee. Against this backdrop, granting autonomy 
to developers in a platform setting may also lead to more trust in the platform vendor. 
These arguments suggest that third-party developers will place more trust in a plat-
form vendor, if higher levels of both clan and self-control are perceived. Accordingly, 
we hypothesize that: H1a: Clan Control is positively related to Trust in Platform 
Vendor. H1b: Self Control is positively related to Trust in Platform Vendor. 
3.2 The Effects of Informal Control Modes on Platform Stickiness 
Clan control is exercised to minimize differences between two parties in terms of their 
interests and goals by declaring common values, beliefs and behaviors [8]. On the one 
hand, clan control is therefore facilitating a sense of belonging and togetherness. 
Working for and with people with similar interests and mindsets and with common 
goals may lead to a homelike feeling along with loyalty and commitment to the group 
or company [23, 33]. On the other hand, shared visions and values are reducing the 
possibility of incongruent preferences and goals. Therefore, if a controlee agrees with 
the controllers’ goals and beliefs and acts in similar ways, the risk of producing vari-
ances in outcomes of importance to the controlee is minimized [23, 33]. This lower 
risk and higher sense of belonging is in turn likely to translate into a higher intention 
to stay with the group. Applied to the platform context, if developers share similar 
values and goals with a platform, they may perceive lower risks and higher cohesive-
ness which in turn may result in a higher intention to keep contributing to the platform 
As mentioned above, self-control is based on self-regulation through granting au-
tonomy to controlees. According to self-determination theory [34], human beings’ 
perceptions of autonomy are related to higher intrinsic motivation, more creativity, 
higher self-esteem, less tension and a higher work satisfaction. Previous empirical 
research has shown that employees feel more satisfied with their working place in an 
organization, when they are not under permanent scrutiny, but feel more independent 
in pursuing their personal goals [35]. This higher autonomy under self-control in plat-
form settings is also likely to translate into higher loyalty with and stickiness to the 
platform, given that developers feel more self-determined, satisfied and more commit-
ted to a platform. In contrast, reducing developers’ autonomy may lead to lower in-
trinsic motivation, less satisfaction and thus in a lower intention to stick with the plat-
form. Consequently, we suggest that third-party developers will have a higher inten-
tion to stick with a platform under a higher perception of clan control and self-control. 
H2a: Clan Control is positively related to Platform Stickiness. H2b: Self-Control is 
positively related to Platform Stickiness. 
3.3 The Mediating Effect of Trust in Platform Vendor 
Given the high importance and prevalence of trust for enduring relationships in plat-
form ecosystems, we suggest that developers’ trust in a platform vendor is one essen-
tial mediation mechanism explaining the effects of clan and self-control on develop-
ers’ intention to stick with a platform. As studies have shown, trusting beliefs are 
transformed into perceptions that a trustee has attributes that can be relied on and that 
are beneficial for the trustor [27]. Trust frees the trustor from worrying about potential 
risks of doing business with the trustee and about the anxiety of being exploited. The 
resulting sense of secureness is likely translated into a comfortable feeling with and 
loyalty towards the other party along with an enjoyment in conducting business to-
gether [36]. A reduced perception of risks, caused by a higher level of trust to a busi-
ness partner, strengthens the loyalty towards this partner [23]. If a business partner is 
trusted, additional exhaustive monitoring of changes in rules or procedures becomes 
unnecessary and therefore saves costs, time and energy [36] which also enhance the 
intention to keep cooperating with a partner. Moreover, according to e-commerce 
literature [37], trust in an online-seller and the resulting satisfaction with the seller 
usually leads to repurchase intentions. Applied to the platform context, if developers 
place trust towards a platform and believe in the platform’s reliability, they may also 
perceive less risk, feel more secure and therefore enjoy working for and with the plat-
form, which in turn may lead to a higher intention to contribute to the platform. 
These arguments and previous empirical evidence suggest that a higher level of 
trust in the platform vendor will lead to a higher intention to stick with the platform. 
Further, given that fostering shared norms and values as well as encouraging self-
management may stimulate trust, we suggest that trust is a major explanatory factory 
of why clan control as well as self-control leads to higher platform stickiness. In other 
words, clan control and self-control will lead to a higher stickiness with the platform 
because of higher trust in the platform vendor. H3a: Effects of Clan Control on Plat-
form Stickiness are mediated by Trust in Platform Vendor. H3b: Effects of Self-
Control on Platform Stickiness are mediated by Trust in Platform Vendor. 
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Fig. 1. Research Model and Hypotheses 
4 Research Methodology 
4.1 Data Collection and Sample Description 
In order to verify our hypotheses, we created an online survey instrument to collect 
empirical data with developers of the above mentioned online gaming platform 
Steam. Steam
1
 is a typical two-sided software platform operated by Valve Corpora-
tion. The platform has more than 75 million registered users worldwide [6] and more 
than 1.000 developers (including professional and freelance game developers) who 
develop, publish and distribute over 3.300 games and even more game modifications 
(called mods) via Steam. Users are provided with installation and automatic updating 
of games on multiple computers, and community features such as friends lists, cloud 
saving, and chat functionality. Steam has introduced an initiative to support develop-
ers (called Steam Greenlight) and tools to simplify the developing and distribution 
process (called Steam Works). With the freely available application programming 
interface (API), developers can integrate many of Steam's functions, including net-
working and matchmaking, in-game achievements, micro-transactions, and support 
for user-created content. In order to develop, publish and distribute games via Steam, 
game developers have to follow specific procedures and adhere to specific rules and 
conditions that serve as typical control mechanisms by the platform. 
To obtain the contact details of Steam developers, we collected the names of all 
third-party developers published on the Steam platform. After deleting duplicate 
names and no longer existing developers, we gathered e-mail addresses or identified 
contact forms and Facebook pages by visiting developers’ websites. Via these chan-
nels, a link to the online survey questionnaire was sent to 870 developer studios, 
                                                          
1 We ran a web crawler on http://store.steampowered.com in July 2014 to get the latest devel-
oper and game statistics. 
along with a letter outlining the purpose of our research, ensuring confidentiality and 
anonymity of the responses, and asking to forward the survey to the lead developer 
who could serve as key informant to provide answers to our survey questions [38]. As 
a reward for participation, participants were entered into a lottery for a tablet, an 
e-book reader or Amazon gift cards. Furthermore, participants received a manage-
ment report with the core results of the study.  
After two follow-up reminders via e-mail, and after deleting responses because of 
missing and inconsistent values, we received 125 valid responses, resulting in a re-
sponse rate of 14.4%. All participating developers were lead developers and repre-
sented a distinct development company. Nonresponse bias was assessed by verifying 
that early and late respondents were not significantly different [39]. Both samples 
were compared based on their sociodemographics and responses to principal con-
structs in the study, and t‑tests between the means of the early (first 50) and late (last 
50) respondents showed no significant differences (p > 0.05). Overall, these findings 
indicate that nonresponse bias is unlikely to be a major issue in this study. 
The majority of developers in our sample were freelance developers (73.4%) and 
were located in the US (34.5%), Canada (10.3%) and the UK (5.2%). Most developer 
companies had been founded after 2007 (69.9%) and employed between 10 and 49 
people (70.4%). Most games published by the developing companies in our sample 
were indie games (70.4%), action (54.8%) and adventure (40%). The prices vary 
mostly between $5US and $20US. Almost 70% of the developers in our sample had 
more than 5 years of game development experience, while 67% had more than 1 year 
of experience with developing for Steam. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Sample Descriptives (N = 125) 
Number of employees in company: Employment of developers: 
< 10 0.0 % Professional game developer 17.4 % 
10 – 49 70.4 % Freelance developer  73.4 % 
50 – 250 24.3 % Hobbyist developer 7.0 % 
> 250 5.3 % Other 2.6 % 
Price range of Steam games: Years of experience in game development: 
< $5 10.4 less than 1 year 1.7 % 
$5 – $10 40.0 1 to 3 years 11.3 % 
$11 – $20 38.3 3 to 5 years 17.4 % 
> $21 11.3 5 to 7 years 17.4 % 
Game genres (multi-selection): 7 to 9 years 14.8 % 
Action 54.8 % More than 9 years 37.4 % 
Adventure 40.0 % Years of experience of developing for Steam: 
Strategy 38.3 % less than 1year 33.0 % 
Roleplaying 25.2 % 1 to 3 years 36.5 % 
Indie 70.4 % 3 to 5 years 19.1 % 
Casual 34.8 % 5 to 7 years 8.7 % 
Simulation 23.5 % 7 to 9 years 1.7 % 
  More than 9 years 0.9 % 
4.2 Measurement of Variables and Measurement Model Assessment 
All constructs in the survey instrument were based on established measures from 
existing scales in IS literature and adapted to the study’s context with minor wording 
changes. Measures for clan control and self-control were adopted from Tiwana and 
Keil [21], based on control measures of Kirsch et al. [19]. We focused the clan control 
measurement on the understanding of the Steam platform’s goals, values, norms and 
rules in order to capture developers’ perception of clan control execution. During our 
qualitative pre-test phase, and because of the specific characteristics of the Steam 
platform compared to organizational clan control, we found this measurement more 
suitable for the Steam context. Measures for platform stickiness were adopted from 
the website stickiness construct of Dahui et al. [40] and adjusted to the general plat-
form context. Given that the measurement model of trust has often been misspecified 
in IS research [41, 42], we modeled trust as a second-order formative construct, fol-
lowing the guidelines provided by Jarvis et al. [43]. We based our trust conceptualiza-
tion on the trusting belief construct of McKnight et al. [28]. We included one item for 
each subdimension of trust (i.e. competence, integrity and benevolence), which was 
found to be appropriate [41]. All the questionnaire items were measured using a 7-
point-Likert scale, anchored at (1) = strongly disagree and (7) = strongly agree. All of 
the items of the constructs and their sources are shown in Table 2 in the Appendix. 
For analyzing measurement properties of a model with second-order factors in 
PLS, we followed the recommendations of Wang and Benbasat [44], by first analyz-
ing the measurement properties of all reflective constructs. Next, we replaced our 
first-order constructs with their latent variable scores provided by SmartPLS, which 
then allows us to analyze the structural paths of the model. 
The psychometric properties of the reflective measurement models were assessed 
by examining content validity, convergent validity, and discriminant validity of all 
latent constructs. In order to ensure content validity, we developed questions for indi-
cators from previous research and performed a qualitative pre-test to check for ambi-
guities. Convergent validity was evaluated using three criteria recommended by 
Fornell and Larcker [45]: (1) all measurement factor loadings must be significant and 
above the threshold value of .70; (2) the composite reliabilities should exceed .80; and 
(3) the average variance extracted (AVE) by each construct must exceed the variance 
due to measurement error for that construct (i.e., AVE should exceed .50). 
All loadings of the reflective measurement items on their respective factors were 
significant (p < .001) and above .827. Composite reliabilities of the constructs were 
all above .937 and the values for AVEs for each construct ranged from .833 to .893. 
Therefore, all of our constructs fulfill these three criteria and met the norms for con-
vergent validity. In addition, for satisfactory discriminant validity, the square root of 
the AVE from the construct should be greater than the variance shared between a 
construct and other constructs in the model [45]. Inter-correlation values between the 
latent variables are ranging between .303 and .601 and are therefore lower than the 
square root of the AVEs, providing strong evidence of discriminant validity. Hence, 
the constructs in our study represent concepts that are both theoretically and empiri-
cally distinguishable. In order to establish construct validity for our formative indica-
tors, we relied on the approach of Ringle et al. [46] by ensuring that the indicator 
weights for formative constructs are roughly equal and all have significant t-values, 
which we were able to determine in SmartPLS for our formative items. 
5 Data Analysis and Results 
We used structural equation modeling using partial least squares (PLS) to test our 
research model in general, and our mediation hypotheses in particular. PLS allows for 
simultaneous testing of the measurement model (the psychometric properties of the 
measurement scales) and the estimation of the structural model (the strength and di-
rection of the relationship between the variables). PLS has an added advantage over 
covariance-based methods (e.g., LISREL) in that (1) it maximizes the explained vari-
ance of endogenous variables in the structural model [47], which enables us to under-
stand the amount of variance explained in the constructs, such as trust in platform 
vendor or platform stickiness, and (2) PLS does not make distributional assumptions 
for the data [47]. We used the software SmartPLS 2.0 M3 [48] and a two-step proce-
dure to examine our hypotheses. In step 1, we analyzed the direct effects of clan con-
trol and self-control on trust in a platform vendor and platform stickiness. In step 2, 
we introduced trust in platform vendor as a mediating mechanism into the structural 
model (by adding the path from trust to stickiness), following the recommendations 
by Preacher and Hayes [49]. The final results of step 2 are shown in Figure 2. 
The structural model in step 1 successfully explained a considerable portion of var-
iance in trust in platform vendor (R
2
 = .279) and platform stickiness (R
2
 = .393). Con-
cerning the path coefficients, we found positive and significant effects of clan control 
on trust in platform vendor (β = .520; p < .001) and on platform stickiness (β = .510; p 
< .001), which is in support of H1a and H2a. Further, self-control similarly had a 
positive and significant effect on platform stickiness (β = .201; p < .05), while there 
was no significant effect on trust in platform vendor (β = .003; p > .05). Therefore, 
H1b could be supported while H2b had to be rejected. 
In step 2 of the PLS-SEM analysis, we assessed the results of the full path model 
including the impact of the mediator trust on platform stickiness. The variance ex-
plained in platform stickiness increased substantially (R
2
 = .450) compared to the 
analysis in step 1, due to the significant positive impact of trust in platform vendor on 
platform stickiness (β = .282; p < .05). Clan control had a significant indirect effect on 
platform stickiness via trust in platform vendor (β = .144, p < .01), while the direct 
effect decreased but remained significant (β = .358, p < .01). Therefore, trust in plat-
form vendor partially (by 29.8 %) mediated the relationship between clan control and 
platform stickiness. Although self-control had a significant direct effect on platform 
stickiness (β = .192; p < .05), we could not find a significant mediation effect on plat-
form stickiness through trust, given that self-control had no significant impact on trust 
in platform vendor (β = .003; p > .05). Therefore, we had to reject H2a. 
We also analyzed a full model including several control variables (i.e., developer 
employment, development experience, number of employees in company), but did not 
find any significant impact on trust or platform stickiness (p > 0.5). 
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Fig. 2. Results of SEM Analysis 
6 Discussion and Conclusion 
Two key findings can be derived from this study. First, our findings show that clan 
control positively impacts both trust in platform vendor and platform stickiness, while 
self-control only affects the latter. Working autonomously may therefore not suffi-
ciently flourish developer’s trust towards a platform vendor. Second, our results show 
that developers’ trust in a platform vendor serves as a mediator between clan control 
and platform stickiness. Given that trust and loyalty are essential parts of relationship 
quality [16] and that an enduring cooperative relationship between a platform vendor 
and third-party developers is crucial for a healthy successful platform [13, 17], our 
findings demonstrate the high importance of informal control in platform setting. 
6.1 Theoretical and practical implications 
From a theoretical standpoint, our study offers a deeper understanding of the effects 
of informal control modes on third-party developers’ trust in a platform vendor and 
platform stickiness in software-platform settings. We show in our study that clan and 
self-control positively affects developers’ intention to stick with a platform, and that 
clan control leads to higher developer’s trust in the platform vendor. The latter is in 
line with related findings in an open source setting [25]. Further, trust positively af-
fects developers’ intention to stick with the platform and therefore serves as an expla-
nation of why clan control positively affects platform stickiness. Our study establishes 
the importance of informal control as a driver for third-party developers’ trust and 
loyalty in platform settings. It thus contributes to IS control literature by studying 
informal control in a yet underexplored context and advances platform governance 
literature by highlighting the importance of informal control as central governance 
devices to shape trust-building and loyalty on platforms. 
Our results have also important implications for practice. First, platform vendors 
may increasingly focus on cultivating trust in their relationship with third-party de-
velopers by keeping in mind that satisfying developers’ needs and expectations about 
the platform might strengthens their trust towards the platform. Platform vendors 
might, for example, continuously provide and expand prior agreed upon resources for 
development and distribution, along with solving technical difficulties and promoting 
the platform products. Second, implementing clan control mechanisms specifically 
affects developer’s trust towards the platform. Platform vendors may promulgate and 
reinforce common values, beliefs and behaviors by publishing regular company news-
letters and best practice solutions, and by arranging socialization processes and cere-
monies, like developer-centric events and conferences (e.g., Apple’s yearly Develop-
ers Conference in San Francisco). Further, encouraging self-management by granting 
more autonomy and structuring the work environment appropriately, platform ven-
dors may additionally encourage developers to exert self-control which additionally 
contributes to developer’s stickiness with the platform. 
6.2 Limitations and Further Research 
As a concluding reflection, we point out the main limitations of our study. First, the 
results of our study are based on a platform in an online gaming context. Such plat-
forms may differ from mobile or social networking platforms, regarding implemented 
informal control modes and the interactions between platform vendors and develop-
ers. Additionally, because the sample consisted mainly of freelance developers with 
indie games, our results may not be representative for professional game development 
studios. Hence, issues of generalizability may exist. Future studies should focus on 
additional software-based platforms, like Apple’s App Store or Google’s Android 
ecosystem, with a more representative mix of hobbyist and professional developers to 
strengthen external validity. Second, we based our measurement of clan control main-
ly on the scope of understanding shared values, goals and rules. Future research could 
examine a broader view of clan control and community behaviors as well as explicitly 
examining the antecedents and impacts of sub-dimensions of trust [28] in order to 
provide a richer understanding of the role of trust and clan control in platform con-
texts. Third, future work may extend our research model by including other factors. 
We focused our study on informal control modes, while the effects of formal control 
modes (process and output) [8] may also lead to promising results. Likewise, other 
factors affecting cooperative relationships (e.g., empathy, security or autonomy) and 
other developer and platform-related outcomes (e.g., application quality, development 
costs or user count) may also enhance our research model. 
6.3 Conclusion 
How can platform vendors create an enduring and cooperative relationship with third-
party developers in order to work towards a successful platform ecosystem? By inte-
grating control literature and trust theory, results of our survey study suggest imple-
menting clan and self-control on platforms cultivates developers’ trust in a platform 
vendor and stickiness with the platform. We believe that examining control modes as 
well as trust in platform settings is a rich avenue for future research, especially given 
that hitherto under-researched informal control modes are gaining in importance. 
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Appendix 
Table 2. Measurement Items 
Constructs Indicators Source 
Clan Control 
(CC) 
Do you clearly understand …  Based on 
[19, 21] ... the goals of the Steam platform. 
... the values of the Steam platform. 
... the norms and rules of the Steam platform. 
Self-Control 
(SC) 
Do you autonomously ... [19, 21] 
... set specific goals without the platform owner’s involvement. 
... set release schedules for your games without the platform own-
er’s involvement. 
... define development and publishing procedures without the 
platform owner’s involvement. 
Trust in 
Platform 
Vendor 
(TBV) 
Regarding the platform vendor … [28] 
… I believe that Steam is capable in solving technical problems. 
… I believe Steam would keep its agreements. 
… Steam would do its best to market and sell my games. 
Platform 
Stickiness 
(PS) 
I am planning to keep using the Steam platform for game 
development and distribution in the future. 
[40] 
I would not hesitate to use the Steam platform for game 
development and distribution in the future. 
I am very likely to use the Steam platform for game development 
and distribution in the future. 
 
 
